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I.&

INTRODUCTION&

The& challenges& for& governments& in& designing& and& implementing& industrial& policies& are& wellT
documented.&There&is,&on&the&one&hand,&a&tension&between&efforts&to&advance&a&vision&of&longT
term&development&and,&on&the&other,&concerns&that&investing&resources&in&a&particular&strategy&
might& turn& out& to& have& been& misguided.& Complicating& those& issues,& there& are& also& tensions&
between&government&actions&aimed&at&encouraging&and&facilitating&economic&activities,&and&the&
government’s& role& as& a& regulator& of& those& activities.& More& specifically,& governments& are& faced&
with& the& task& of& balancing& efforts& to& attract,& promote& and& sustain& business& activities& alongside&
efforts& to& ensure& that& broader& policy& aims& are& served& by,& for& example,& ensuring& companies&
comply&with&laws&on&taxation,&labor&standards,&environmental&protection,&and&consumer&rights.&
But& governments& have& successfully& navigated& those& issues,& actively& shaping& and& promoting&
strategies& for& sustainable& growth& of& their& economies,& and& doing& so& through& various& roles& as&
commercial&actors,&economic&strategists,&and&guardians&of&the&public&interest.&Scrutiny&over&the&
way&governments&are&performing&these&actions,&however,&is&increasing.&&
In&particular,&over&roughly&the&past&15&years,&a&new&regime&has&emerged&that&gives&individuals&
and&enterprises&enhanced&protections&from&government&conduct&that&hurts&their&profits.&This&is&
the&regime&that&has&been&created&by&thousands&of&bilateral&and&multilateral&investment&treaties&
concluded& by& developed& and& developing& countries& worldwide,& and& the& decisions& issued& by& ad&
hoc&tribunals&interpreting&and&applying&those&treaties&in&disputes&between&investors&and&states.1&&

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
1

&There&is&a&debate&about&whether&a&“regime”&or&“system”&actually&exists&given&that&international&

Importantly,& this& new& regime& is& oneTsided& in& two& important& respects:& first,& it& allows& covered&
investors&to&sue&governments&but&generally&does&not&allow&governments&to&initiate&disputes&to&
sue& investors.& Second,& its& protections& only& permit& challenges& to& government& actions& (or&
omissions)&that&harm&investments,&thus&skewing&in&a&direction&that&puts&pressure&on&government&
regulation.2&These& two& factors& –& combined& with& the& high& costs& of& arbitration,& the& potentially&
large&damages&awards&tribunals&may&render&if&they&find&states&liable&for&treaty&breach,&and&the&
limited&avenues&open&to&states&to&challenge&adverse&awards&–&make&these&investment&treaties&
powerful&instruments&with&significant&consequences&for&states.&
The&stakes&are&particularly&high&for&government&efforts&to&use&foreign&investment&as&a&strategy&
for& implementing& industrial& policy.& Investors& have& used& investment& treaties& to& successfully&
challenge& a& range& of& government& conduct& inherent& in& investment& enticement,& approval,& and&
operation.& Tribunals& deciding& treatyTbased& investorTstate& disputes& have& determined& that&
governments&have&violated&investment&treaties&through&action&taken&to:&&
•
•
•
•

encourage&and&admit&investment&in&infrastructure&and&the&extractive&industries;&&
leverage&those&investments&for&longTterm,&broadTbased&sustainable&development;&
refine&the&legal&and&regulatory&framework&over&time&to&adjust&to&changing&circumstances&
and&needs;&and&
administer&regulatory&schemes&in&such&areas&as&environmental&protection,&taxation,&and&
pricing&for&infrastructure&services.&

A&key&message&arising&from&these&cases&is&that&good&faith&conduct&consistent&with&domestic&law&
can&still&give&rise&to&treaty&liability.&When&a&tribunal&evaluates&an&investor’s&claim&that&the&host&
state& has& breached& an& investment& treaty,& domestic& law&does& not& govern& the& dispute.& Issues& of&
deference,&standards&of&proof,&standards&of&liability,&and&rules&on&damages&all&become&unhinged&
from&the&host&country’s&legal&system,&and&are&resolved&instead&under&the&rules&and&mechanisms&
established&by&the&treaty.3&Those&treaty&rules&and&mechanisms,&in&turn,&are&often&vaguely&stated&
and& have& been& subjected& to& diverse& interpretations& by& commentators& and& tribunals,& making& it&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
2

&There&are&potential&cases&where&cases&could&encourage&public&interest&regulation&rather&than&
limit&it.&An&action&by&a&foreign&investor&challenging&government&support&of&an&antiTcompetitive&
enterprise&in&violation&of&the&government’s&own&competition&laws&could,&for&example,&be&used&to&
encourage&effective&government&regulation.&&
3
&The&fact&that&international&standards&can&and&do&trump&domestic&law&inconsistent&with&those&
standards&is,&alone,&not&surprising&in&the&realm&of&international&law.&But&what&is&surprising&is&that&
when& deciding& whether& and& how& international& treaty& standards& should& override& domestic& law,&
and&what&damages&to&order,&tribunals&do&not&always&accord&states&the&deference&typically&said&to&
be& a& feature& of& international& law,& much& less& the& level& of& deference& common& for& reviewing&
allegations&of&harms&to&economic&interests&of&business&entities,&as&opposed&to&violations&of&the&
cogens& rights& and& nonTderogable& rights& of& individuals.& See,& e.g.,& Caroline& Henckels,& Balancing(
Investment( Protection( and( Sustainable( Development( in( Investor8State( Arbitration:( The( Role( of(
Deference(in&Yearbook&on&International&Investment&Law&and&Policy&2012T2013&(Oxford&University&
Press,& forthcoming& 2014)& (discussing& standards& of& review& applied& by& tribunals& in& treatyTbased&
investorTstate&arbitrations).&
&

2&

difficult&to&understand&ex(ante&just&what&the&treaty&means&and&how&to&avoid&and&defend&against&
claims&of&breach.&&
This&paper&seeks&to&address&some&of&those&issues&by&illustrating&how&tribunals&have&judged&state&
actions& and& omissions& in& connection& with& encouraging,& admitting& and& regulating& investments.&
The&aim&is&not&to&say&what&the&law&is,&but&to&illustrate&what&it&has&been&interpreted&to&be,&and&
how&it&therefore&might&be&interpreted&in&future&disputes.&&
The&cases&highlighted&are&those&with&particularly&significant&implications&for&industrial&policy&and&
sustainable&development&–&namely,&investments&in&infrastructure&and&the&extractive&industries.&
The& issues& focused& on& are& liability& for& government& conduct& (1)& in& connection& with& tenders& and&
negotiations;&(2)&when&responding&to&questions&regarding&the&legality&of&the&investment;&(3)&in&
using& performance& requirements& to& leverage& benefits& and& capture& spillovers& from& the&
investment;&(4)&changing&the&legal&framework&governing&an&investment&in&response&to&evolving&
needs,& circumstances,& and& interests;& (5)& administering& the& investment;& and& (6)& requesting,& and&
responding&to&requests&for,&renegotiation.&&
Following& the& cases,& this& paper& concludes& by& outlining& options& for& addressing& and& minimizing&
tensions&between&investment&treaties&and&industrial&policy.&

II.&

TENDERS&AND&NEGOTIATIONS&

PSEG(V.(TURKEY: 4&STATE&LIABILITY&FOR&FAILED&NEGOTIATIONS &
Governments& engaging& with& private& entities& for& investment& in& extractives,& infrastructure,& or&
other& projects& commonly& select& their& partners& and& frame& the& deal& through& tenders,& direct&
negotiations,&or&a&combination&of&the&two.&Investors&often&expend&significant&time&and&resources&
engaging& in& those& processes& even& though& there& is& a& risk& that& their& bids& will& be& rejected& or& the&
negotiations&will&collapse.&
Domestic&law&sometimes&provides&unsuccessful&bidders&with&avenues&to&challenge&government’s&
decision. 5 &Negotiating& parties& might& also& enter& into& preTcontractual& agreements& to& provide&
compensation& for& costs& incurred& in& trying& to& conclude& a& deal.6&But& if& there& is& an& investment&
treaty&in&place,&investors&need&not&be&limited&by&those&avenues&of&relief.&Tribunals&have&allowed&
investors&to&recover&costs&expended&in&preTcontract&and&preTproject&phases,&and,&in&some&cases,&

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
4

&PSEG&v.&Turkey,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/02/5,&Award,&January&19,&2007.&
&See&generally,&UNCITRAL&Legislative&Guide&on&Privately&Financed&Infrastructure&Projects&(2001),&
paras.&127T131.&
6
&See,&e.g.,&FTW&Oil&Interests,&Inc.&v.&Trinidad&and&Tobago,&ICSID&Case&No&ARB/01/14,&Award,&
March&3,&2006&(referring&to&the&claimant’s&attempt&to&secure&such&an&agreement&from&the&
government,&and&to&principles&in&the&domestic&law&of&some&jurisdictions&that&might,&in&some&
circumstances,&provide&compensation&for&expenses&incurred&in&connection&with&preTproject&
activities).&
5

&

3&

have&even&allowed&investors&to&recover&future&lost&profits&they&argue&they&would&have&recovered&
if&they&had&been&selected&for&the&project.7&
PSEG(v.(Turkey&is&an&example.&In&that&case,&the&investor&proposed&development&of&a&mining&and&
power& plant& project,& and& submitted& a& feasibility& study& to& the& Ministry& of& Energy& and& Natural&
Resources&in&order&to&proceed&with&those&plans.&The&Ministry&of&Energy&and&Natural&Resources&
approved&the&study&and,&in&August&1996,&initialed&an&“Implementation&Contract”&with&PSEG&and&
submitted& that& agreement& for& approval& by& the& Turkish& Council& of& State& as& required& under&
domestic&law.&
While&awaiting&approval&of&the&contract,&however,&PSEG&was&also&seeking&to&alter&the&nature&of&
the&project.&One&fundamental&issue&was&that&PSEG&had&revised&its&mining&plan&after&submitting&
the&feasibility&study,&and&those&revisions&resulted&in&increased&costs&for&the&mine&that&PSEG&then&
hoped& to& recover& through& increasing& the& government’s& obligations& to& purchase& power& from&
PSEG’s& proposed& plant.& Additionally,& PSEG& proposed& restructuring& the& investment& through& a&
different& corporate& vehicle& based& outside& Turkey,& with& the& new& approach& designed& to& free& it&
from&having&to&pay&over&USD&250&million&in&taxes&to&Turkey&over&the&life&of&the&project.&&
In&March&1998,&the&Turkish&Council&of&State&approved&the&Implementation&Contract&in&largely&the&
form&it&had&originally&been&submitted&–&i.e.,&based&on&the&original&feasibility&study.&The&project,&
however,& remained& stalled& as& the& parties& had& still& not& reached& agreement& on& key& elements&
necessary&for&it&to&go&forward.&In&light&of&PSEG’s&revised&mine&plan&and&the&new&economics&of&the&
project,&central&issues&remained&unsettled&such&as&the&plant’s&generating&capacity,&the&required&
government&take,&the&company’s&corporate&form,&and&appropriate&tariffs.&&
A&few&crucial&shifts&and&triggers&seem&to&have&exacerbated&disagreements&between&the&parties.&
For& one,& Turkey& appeared& increasingly& skeptical& of& the& project’s& benefits,& and& was& concerned&
about&the&nature&and&extent&of&the&financial&obligations&it&would&be&assuming&in&favor&of&PSEG&if&
required&to&purchase&power&from&the&plant&under&the&terms&sought&by&the&investor.&Additionally,&
after& the& tax& law& was& changed& to& remove& the& roughly& USD& 250& million& tax& burden& associated&
with&incorporation&of&the&project&company&in&Turkey,&PSEG&nevertheless&continued&to&demand&
compensation& for& those& alleged& tax& payments& even& though& it& no& longer& had& to& make& them.&
Another& point& of& tension& arose& when,& after& PSEG& sought& the& Ministry& of& Mines’& approval& to&
change&the&nature&of&its&contract&from&a&concession&contract&to&a&private&law&contract&(allowing&
the&investor&access&to&arbitration),&the&Ministry&of&Mines&indicated&it&would&only&support&PSEG’s&
request&if&other&aspects&of&the&Implementation&Contract&were&renegotiated&and&agreed.&&
Ultimately,& the& points& of& contention& became& intractable& and& brought& the& collapse& of& the&
negotiations.& PSEG& then& responded& by& initiating& arbitration& under& the& investment& treaty&
between&Turkey&and&the&United&States,&seeking&as&damages&invested&costs&and&lost&future&profits&
from&the&project.&
The&tribunal&found&in&favor&of&PSEG,&determining&that&Turkey’s&conduct&violated&the&treaty’s&fair&
and& equitable& treatment& (FET)& standard.& In& reaching& that& conclusion,& it& adopted& an& approach&
giving& investors& significant& preTcontractual& rights& that& translate& into& significant& hostTstate&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
7

&

&See&Joseph&Charles&Lemire&v.&Ukraine,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/06/18,&Award,&March&28,&2011.&
4&

obligations.&The&language&is&worth&quoting&in&order&to&illustrate&the&tribunal’s&view&of&just&what&
the&FET&obligation&requires:&&&
246.( The( Tribunal( is( persuaded( …( ( that( the( fair( and( equitable( treatment( standard( has(
been(breached,(and(that(this(breach(is(serious(enough(as(to(attract(liability.(Short(of(bad(
faith,( there( is( in( the( present( case( first( an( evident( negligence( on( the( part( of( the(
administration(in(the(handling(of(the(negotiations(with(the(Claimants.(The(fact(that(key(
points( of( disagreement( went( unanswered( and( were( not( disclosed( in( a( timely( manner,(
that( silence( was( kept( when( there( was( evidence( of( such( persisting( and( aggravating(
disagreement,(that(important(communications(were(never(looked(at,(and(that(there(was(
a( systematic( attitude( not( to( address( the( need( to( put( an( end( to( negotiations( that( were(
leading( nowhere,( are( all( manifestations( of( serious( administrative( negligence( and(
inconsistency.(The(Claimants(were(indeed(entitled(to(expect(that(the(negotiations(would(
be(handled(competently(and(professionally,(as(they(were(on(occasion.(
247.(Secondly,(there(is(a(breach(of(the(obligation(to(accord(fair(and(equitable(standard(
of(treatment(in(light(of(abuse(of(authority,(evidenced(in(particular,(but(not(exclusively,(by(
the(discussion(of([PSEG’s(application(to(convert(the(contract(to(a(private(law(contract].(
As( noted( above,( MENR’s( demands( for( a( renegotiation( went( far( beyond( the( purpose( of(
the(Law(and(attempted(to(reopen(aspects(of(the(Contract(that(were(not(at(issue(in(this(
context(or(even(within(MENR’s(authority.(
248.( Inconsistent( administrative( acts( are( also( evident( in( this( case( in( respect( of( some(
matters.( …( A( witness( for( the( Claimants( testified( that( since( 1996( “the( various( groups(
determining(energy(policy(in(Turkey(have(not(worked(harmoniously.”(
…(
250.(Thirdly,(the(Tribunal(also(finds(that(the(fair(and(equitable(treatment(obligation(was(
seriously(breached(by(what(has(been(described(above(as(the(“roller8coaster”(effect(of(the(
continuing(legislative(changes.(This(is(particularly(the(case(of(the(requirements(relating,(
in( law( or( practice,( to( the( continuous( change( in( the( conditions( governing( the( corporate(
status( of( the( Project,( and( the( constant( alternation( between( private( law( status( and(
administrative(concessions(that(went(back(and(forth.(This(was(also(the(case,(to(a(more(
limited(extent,(of(the(changes(in(tax(legislation.(
…(
254…(Stability(cannot(exist(in(a(situation(where(the(law(kept(changing(continuously(and(
endlessly,( as( did( its( interpretation( and( implementation.( While( in( complex( negotiations,(
such( as( those( involved( in( this( case,( many( changes( will( occur( beyond( the( control( of( the(
government,(as(was(particularly(the(case(with(the(increased(costs,(the(issue(is(that(the(
longer(term(outlook(must(not(be(altered(in(such(a(way(that(will(end(up(being(no(outlook(
at(all.(In(this(case,(it(was(not(only(the(law(that(kept(changing(but(notably(the(attitudes(
and(policies(of(the(administration.((
…(

&
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256.( Even( if( all( the( above( conduct( were( to( comply( with( good( faith,( which( the( Tribunal(
has( no( reason( not( to( believe,( there( still( would( be( an( evident( breach( of( the( fair( and(
equitable( treatment( standard( under( the( Treaty,( and( under( Turkish( law.( To( the( extent(
that(this(caused(damage,(compensation(will(of(necessity(be(awarded.(
The& tribunal’s& decision& thus& imposed& treaty& liability& on& Turkey& for& “negligent”& or& inattentive&
conduct&during&contract&negotiations,&and&for&changes&in&background&law&and&policy&impacting&a&
project& even& before& the& essential& terms& of& that& project& had& been& agreed& (due& to& investorT
requested& changes& to& the& original& Implementation& Contract).& The& PSEG& decision& instructs& that&
governments&may&be&penalized&for&letting&negotiations&drag&on&when&they&are&ambivalent&about&
projects,& and& that& they& might& also& be& found& to& breach& their& treaty& obligations& when& shifting&
policies&and&growing&concerns&about&the&costs&and&benefits&of&a&deal&cause&them&to&walk&away&
from&talks&even&though&they&had&yet&to&crystallize&into&an&agreement.8&&
As& damages,& the& tribunal& ordered& the& government& to& compensate& the& investor& for& costs&
expended& from& the& submission& of& its& feasibility& study& through& continued& negotiations& in& the&
effort& to& develop& the& project.& All& expenses& were& entirely& preTconstruction,& many& preT
Implementation&Contract,&and&many&were&also&prior&to&the&Turkish&Council&of&State’s&approval&of&
the&Concession&Contract.&In&all,&the&tribunal&declared&that&Turkey&had&to&pay&PSEG&USD&9&million&
plus&interest,&and&bear&65%&of&the&roughly&USD&21&million&in&arbitration&costs.&
Other&relevant&disputes&include&Lemire(v.(Ukraine9&(tenders&for&radio&broadcasting&frequencies);&
Parkerings( v.( Lithuania10&(tender& for& development& and& operation& of& parking& infrastructure& and&
operations);& F8W( Oil( v.( Trinidad( and( Tobago 11 ((tenders& and& negotiations& for& a& contract& to&
develop&offshore&oil&resources);&and&Nordzucker(v.(Poland12&(negotiations&for&purchase&of&stateT
owned& companies& through& privatization& process);& Mihaly( v.( Sri( Lanka 13 &(negotiations& for&
development&of&power&plant).&
&

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
8

&See&also&id.,&paras.&179T186.&
&Joseph&Charles&Lemire&v.&Ukraine,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/06/18,&Award,&March&28,&2011.&
10
&ParkeringsTCompagniet&AS&v.&Republic&of&Lithuania,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/05/8,&Award,&Sept.&11,&
2007.&
11
&FTW& Oil& Interests,& Inc.& v.& Trinidad& and& Tobago,& ICSID& Case& No& ARB/01/14,& Award,& March& 3,&
2006.&
12
&Nordzucker&v.&Poland,&Partial&Award,&December&10,&2008;&Second&Partial&Award,&January&28,&
2009;&and&Third&Partial&and&Final&Award,&November&23,&2009.&
13
&Mihaly&v.&Sri&Lanka,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/00/2,&Award,&March&15,&2002.&
9
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III.&

ILLEGAL&INVESTMENTS&

RDC(V.(GUATEMALA 14(AND(KARDASSOPOLOUS(V.(GEORGIA 15:&LIMITING&THE&
GOVERNMENT’S&ROLE&TO&CHALLENGE&ILLEGALITY&OF&CONTRACT&
Governments&sometimes&face&the&problem&that&they&have&authorized&an&investment&or&entered&
into&an&investment&agreement,&but&have&done&so&based&on&fraud&or&misrepresentations&by&the&
investor,&or&through&corrupt,&illegal,&or&ultra&vires&acts&of&the&government.&In&some&jurisdictions,&
investment&authorizations&or&agreements&infected&with&these&issues&are&deemed&void&ab&initio,&
are&voidable,&or&are&deemed&unenforceable.&&
In&the&case&of&illegal&or&ultra&vires&acts&by&the&government,&jurisdictions&may&deem&contracts&void&
or&unenforceable&even&though&applying&that&rule&may&effectively&penalize&the&investor&not&only&
for&improper&conduct&by&the&government&in&which&the&investor&was&similarly&complicit&(e.g.,&in&
the&case&of&corruption),&but&also&in&circumstances&when&the&government&was&acting&illegally&or&
outside&the&scope&of&its&authority,&and&the&investor&was&unaware&(perhaps&negligently&so)&of&the&
legal&issues&with&its&investment.&
Some& countries& apply& a& strict& rule& against& recognizing& or& enforcing& these& defective& contracts&
even& if& the& investor& was& an& innocent& party& misled& by& the& government,& and& irrespective& of&
whether&the&government&was&knowingly&or&negligently&at&fault.&A&rationale&behind&this&approach&
is& that& assessing& financial& responsibility& against& the& government& for& improper& or& unauthorized&
actions& of& its& officials& would& have& the& undesirable& policy& outcome& of& penalizing& the& public& for&
that&wrongful&conduct.&
Tribunals,& however,& have& adopted& a& different& rule,& determining& that& if& the& state& or& a& stateT
owned&entity&were&involved&in&or&aware&of&the&illegality&of&a&particular&investment&agreement,&
that& fact& would& preclude& the& government& from& later& arguing& that& the& illegality& rendered& the&
agreement& null& and& void.& This& issue& arose& in& Kardassopoulos( v.( Georgia. 16&In& that& case,& the&
tribunal&determined&that&the&underlying&contracts&for&development&of&petroleum&resources&and&
related& infrastructure& appeared& to& have& been& entered& into& through& ultra( vires& acts& of& stateT
owned& enterprises& and& to& be& void& ab( initio& under& Georgian& law.& It& concluded,& however,& that&
illegality&of&the&contracts&under&domestic&law&did&not&prevent&it&from&taking&jurisdiction&over&a&
dispute&arising&out&of&alleged&contract&rights.&It&reasoned:&
[E]ven(if(the([Joint(Venture(Agreement](and(the(Concession(were(entered(into(in(breach(
of( Georgian( law,( the( fact( remains( that( these( two( agreements( were( “cloaked( with( the(
mantle( of( Governmental( authority”.( Claimant( had( every( reason( to( believe( that( these(
agreements(were(in(accordance(with(Georgian(law,(not(only(because(they(were(entered(
into(by(Georgian(State8owned(entities,(but(also(because(their(content(was(approved(by(
Georgian( Government( officials( without( objection( as( to( their( legality( on( the( part( of(
Georgia(for(many(years(thereafter.(Claimant(therefore(had(a(legitimate(expectation(that(
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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&RDC&v.&Guatemala,&Second&Decision&on&Objections&to&Jurisdiction,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/07/23,&
May&18,&2010.&
15
&Kardassopoulos&v.&Georgia,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/05/18,&Decision&on&Jurisdiction,&July&6,&2007.&
16
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his( investment( in( Georgia( was( in( accordance( with( relevant( local( laws.( Respondent( is(
accordingly(estopped(from(objecting(to(the(Tribunal’s(jurisdiction(ratione(materiae(under(
the(ECT(and(the(BIT(on(the(basis(that(the(JVA(and(the(Concession(could(be(void(ab(initio(
under(Georgian(law.17(
The&tribunal&in&RDC(v.(Guatemala&adopted&a&similar&approach.&In&that&dispute,&the&respondent&
state&had&argued&that&the&private&investor’s&contracts&for&development&and&operation&of&railways&
in&the&country&were&invalid&under&domestic&law&as&they&were&not&secured&through&public&bidding&
as& required,& and& had& not& received& the& necessary& congressional& or& presidential& approvals.& That&
illegality,& Guatemala& contended,& prevented& the& contracts& from& qualifying& as& covered&
“investments”&made&pursuant&to&domestic&law&as&required&by&the&treaty.18&The&tribunal&rejected&
those&arguments&on&grounds&of&fairness.&It&said:&
146.( ( Even( if( FEGUA’s( actions( [as( the( government( entity( entering( into( the( contracts]( …(
were(ultra(vires((not(“pursuant(to(domestic(law”),(“principles(of(fairness”(should(prevent(
the(government(from(raising(“violations(of(its(own(law(as(a(jurisdictional(defense(when(
[in( this( case,( operating( in( the( guise( of( FEGUA,( it]( knowingly( overlooked( them( and(
[effectively(endorsed(an(investment(which(was(not(in(compliance(with(its(law.”((
147.((Based(on(these(considerations(the(Tribunal(finds(that(Respondent(is(precluded(from(
raising( any( objection( to( the( Tribunal’s( jurisdiction( on( the( ground( that( Claimant’s(
investment(is(not(a(covered(investment(under(the(Treaty(or(the(ICSID(Convention.19(
This& limitation& to& the& legality& requirement& is& notable& in& that& would& effectively& override& some&
countries’& legal& and& policy& decisions& to& strictly& prevent& enforcement& of& illegal& contracts& or&
contracts&secured&through&ultra&vires&conduct.&Due&to&the&difficulties&of&rooting&out&corruption&or&
other&impropriety,&rules&against&enforcement&can&act&as&prophylactic&measures&preventing&such&
wrongful& and& usually& opaque& conduct.& Furthermore,& strengthening& the& force& of& those& rules,& at&
least&some&jurisdictions&do&not&allow&private&entities&to&use&doctrines&of&reliance&or&estoppel&to&
avoid&their&potentially&harsh&effects.20&As&Guatemala&thus&argued&in&RDC,&binding&governments&
to& illegal,& ultra& vires,& or& improperly& secured& contracts& could& “severely& and& improperly& restrict&
State& sovereignty.& Taken& to& the& extreme,& a& brightTline& rule& that& a& State& is& estopped& from&
exercising&preTexisting&domestic&remedies&to&question&the&validity&of&a&contract&simply&because&

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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&Id.&at&para.&194.&
&RDC&v.&Guatemala,&Second&Decision&on&Objections&to&Jurisdiction,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/07/23,&
May&18,&2010,&para.&140&(quoting&CAFTA,&art.&10.28(g)).&
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&RDC&v.&Guatemala,&Second&Decision&on&Objections&to&Jurisdiction,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/07/23,&
May& 18,& 2010,& paras.& 146T47& (quoting& Fraport& AG& Frankfurt& Airport& Services& Worldwide& v.&
Republic&of&the&Philippines,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/03/25,&Award,&August&16,&2007,&para.&346).&
20
&In& the& United& States,& see,& e.g.,& Office& of& Personnel& Management& v.& Richmond,& 496& U.S.& 419&
(1990);&Fed.&Crop.&Ins.&Corp.&v.&Merrill,&332&U.S.&380&(1947).&
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the& State& had& operated& under& that& contract& for& a& period& of& time& could& prevent& a& State& from&
terminating&a&contract&initiated&by&bribery&or&corruption.”21&
Other& relevant& disputes& on& the& impact& of& the& legality& of& investments& include& Inceysa( v.( El(
Salvador 22 ((finding& no& jurisdiction& over& investment& secured& through& fraud),& Metal( Tech( v.(
Uzbekistan 23 &(rejecting& jurisdiction& over& investment& made& through& corruption),& and& Vanessa(
Ventures(v.(Venezuela24((determining&it&had&jurisdiction&over&an&investment&even&though&it&was&
made&in&breach&of&the&contract).&

IV.& LEVERAGING&INVESTMENTS&FOR&SUSTAINABLE&
DEVELOPMENT&

MOBIL(V.(CANADA: 25&BROAD&PROHIBITIONS&ON&PERFORMANCE&
REQUIREMENTS&WITH&ONLY&NARROW&EXCEPTIONS &
&
Some& disputes& address& the& legality& of& government& efforts& to& leverage& investments& for&
sustainable&development&through&the&imposition&of&performance&requirements.&One&such&case&
is&Mobil(v.(Canada,&a&decision&potentially&signaling&where&future&cases&could&head.&
The&dispute&arose&out&of&the&following&facts:&In&the&late&1970s,&when&oil&fields&were&discovered&
off&the&coast&of&Newfoundland,&Canada,&the&federal&and&provincial&governments&recognized&the&
opportunity& that& the& discovery& provided& for& catalyzing& longTterm& sustainable& growth& and&
development& in& the& country.& They& put& in& place& a& legal& regime& designed& to& achieve& that& aim,&
enacting& the& 1987& “Accord& Act”& to,& among& other& objectives,& require& investors& engaging& in&
development& of& the& offshore& resources& to& make& “expenditures& …& for& research& and&
development”&(R&D)&and&“for&education&and&training”&(E&T)&in&the&local&province.26&&
In& the& midT1990s,& Canada& concluded& the& North& American& Free& Trade& Agreement& (NAFTA)& with&
the&United&States&and&Mexico,&which&contains&restrictions&on&performance&requirements&(such&
as&requirements&to&procure&services&locally)&in&its&investment&chapter.&Canada&listed&the&Accord&
Act& as& an& exception& to& the& treaty’s& restrictions& on& performance& requirements.& The& NAFTA& also&
included& within& that& exception& any& “subordinate& measure& adopted& or& maintained& under& the&
authority&of&and&consistent&with&the&[Accord&Act].”&&

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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&RDC& v.& Guatemala,& ICSID& Case& No.& ARB/07/23,& Award,& June& 29,& 2012,& para.& 197& (quoting&
Guatemala’s&Rejoinder&on&the&Merits,&October&21,&2011,&para.&185).&
22
&Inceysa&Vallisoletana&S.L.&v.&El&Salvador,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/03/26,&Award,&Aug.&2,&2006.&
23
&Metal&Tech&Ltd.&v.&Republic&of&Uzbekistan,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB/10/3,&Award,&October&4,&2013.&
24
&Vanessa&Ventures&v.&Venezuela,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB(AF)/04/6,&Award,&Jan.&16,&2013.&
25
&Mobil&Investments&Canada,&Inc.&v.&Canada,&ICSID&Case&No.&ARB(AF)/07/4,&Decision&on&Liability&
and&on&Principles&of&Quantum,&May&22,&2012.&
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Pursuant&to&the&Accord&Act,&the&Canadian&government&issued&a&series&of&guidelines&in&the&1980s&
relating& to& investors’& obligations& on& R&D& and& other& matters.& Then,& in& 2004,& Canadian& officials&
issued& new& guidelines& under& the& Accord& Act& which& imposed& additional& and& stronger&
requirements&on&investors&in&the&offshore&oilfields&to&invest&in&R&D&and&E&T.&&
Mobil&objected&to&the&guidelines&and&challenged&them&under&Canadian&law.&After&losing&their&suit&
before& domestic& courts,& the& claimants& initiated& an& investorTstate& arbitration& under& the& NAFTA&
arguing,& in& relevant& part,& that& the& new& guidelines’& heightened& requirements& to& invest& in& R&D&
violated&the&NAFTA’s&prohibitions&on&performance&requirements.&&
Canada& responded& that& the& performance& requirements& were& not& prohibited& by& the& treaty&
because&the&restrictions&on&performance&requirements&did&not&cover&measures&requiring&R&D&or&
E&T.& Canada& also& argued& that& if& the& guidelines& were& deemed& to& constitute& performance&
requirements,& they& were& nevertheless& covered& by& the& government’s& exception& for& the& Accord&
Act&and&its&subordinate&measures.&&
The&tribunal,&however,&sided&with&Mobil&on&both&issues.&It&decided&that&the&NAFTA’s&prohibition&
on& requirements& to& procure& services& locally& included& a& prohibition& on& requirements& for& local&
R&D&and&E&T.&It&then&determined&that&the&new&and&more&demanding&guidelines&departed&from&
previous& practice& to& such& an& extent& that& they& could& not& be& deemed& to& fall& within& Canada’s&
exception&to&the&NAFTA&for&the&Accord&Act&and&its&subordinate&measures.&
Importantly,& through& these& interpretations,& the& majority& adopted& a& broad& view& of& prohibited&
performance&requirements&and&a&narrow&view&of&exceptions&to&treaty&provisions&protecting&use&
of&those&tools.&&
&

V.&

RENEGOTIATION&REQUESTS (

MISCELLANEOUS( CASES:& REQUIREMENTS& TO& RESPOND& TO& RENEGOTIATION&
REQUESTS&AND&RESTRICTIONS&ON&INITIATING&THEM &&
International&contracts&–&particularly&those&running&over&long&time&horizons&such&as&contracts&for&
investments& in& infrastructure& or& the& extractive& industries& –& are& often& renegotiated.& Some& of&
these& renegotiations& are& “intraTdeal& renegotiations”,& meaning& that& the& contract& itself& provides&
that&certain&parts&of&the&agreement&may&or&will&be&renegotiated&at&specified&times&or&in&certain&
circumstances.27&The& renegotiation& takes& place& in& accordance& with& the& original& contract.28&An&
example& is& a& clause& requiring& a& periodic& review& of& tariffs& charged& for& water& or& electricity,& or& a&
clause&providing&for&an&extraordinary&review&of&those&tariffs&in&the&event&of&particular&events&or&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
27

&Jeswald&Salacuse,&Renegotiating&International&Business&Transactions:&The&Continuing&Struggle&
of&Life&Against&Form,&35&Int’l&Law&1507,&1508T1509&(2001).&
28
&Id.&
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circumstances.& These& provisions& aim& to& inject& flexibility& into& the& deal& in& order& to& enable& it& to&
survive&over&time&and&under&changing&circumstances.29&
Other&renegotiations&are&“extraTdeal&renegotiations”:&
These(negotiations(take(place(“extra8deal,”(for(they(occur(outside(the(framework(of(the(
existing( agreement.( Forced( renegotiation( of( mineral( concession( contracts( of( the( 1960s(
and(1970s,(negotiations(to(reschedule(loans(following(the(Third(World(debt(crisis(of(the(
early(1980s,(and(the(restructuring(of(infrastructure(and(financial(agreements(in(the(wake(
of( the( Asian( financial( crisis( of( the( late( 1990s( all( fit( within( the( category( of( extra8deal(
renegotiations.( In( each( case,( one( of( the( participants( was( seeking( relief( from( a( legally(
binding(obligation(without(any(basis(for(renegotiation(in(the(agreement(itself.30&
Each& type& of& renegotiation& has& figured& as& an& issue& in& investment& disputes,& with& tribunals’&
decisions&having&noteworthy&implications&for&states’&conduct&in&connection&with&both&intraTdeal&
and&extraTdeal&talks.&&&

INTRATDEAL&RENEGOTIATIONS&
Several&cases&indicate&that,&irrespective&of&what&the&contract&or&relevant&domestic&law&provides,&
treaties& may& impose& an& additional& layer& of& obligations& and& potential& liability& on& governments&
relating&to&their&conduct&in&pursuing&or&responding&to&requests&for&intraTdeal&renegotiations.&&
In& PSEG( v.( Turkey,& as& noted& above,& the& tribunal& signaled& that& investors& are& “entitled& to& expect&
that&[their]&negotiations&[will]&be&handled&competently&and&professionally,”&and&that&there&will&
be&a&breach&of&the&FET&obligation&if&those&expectations&are&not&met.31&In&Saluka(v.(Czech(Republic,&
the& tribunal& stated& that& the& treaty’s& FET& provision& required& the& state& to& “take[]& seriously& a&
proposal& that& has& sufficient& potential& to& solve& the& [relevant]& problem& and& deal& with& it& in& an&
objective,& transparent,& unbiased& and& evenThanded& way.” 32 &Citing& those& two& decisions,& the&
tribunal&in&Frontier(Services(v.(Czech(Republic&declared&that&the&requirement&of&good&faith&was&
central&to&the&FET&standard&and&that&a&failure&to&negotiate&in&good&faith&would&thus&violate&the&
treaty& obligation.33&It& added& that& liability& could& still& attach& even& if& the& state& were& not& acting& in&
bad&faith.&34&
In&Teco(v.(Guatemala,&the&tribunal&stated&that&a&lack&of&administrative&due&process&in&an&interT
deal&tariff&review&processes&would&violate&the&FET&obligation.35&An&administrative&body’s&failure&
to&provide&reasons&supporting&its&decisions,&or&to&abide&by&its&own&procedural&rules&were&factors&
that&the&tribunal&viewed&as&establishing&a&lack&of&administrative&due&process&and,&consequently,&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
29
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&Frontier&Services&v.&Czech&Republic,&para.&300.&
35
&Teco&v.&Guatemala,&para.&457.&
30

&

11&

a&treaty&breach.36&The&tribunal&added&that&the&facts&that&those&alleged&failings&had&already&been&
challenged& before& Guatemalan& courts,& that& those& courts& had& upheld& the& legitimacy& of& the&
government’s&conduct&under&Guatemalan&law,&and&that&there&was&no&indication&or&allegation&of&
a&denial&of&justice&or&corruption&in&those&judicial&proceedings,&did&not&prevent&the&tribunal&from&
taking& jurisdiction& over& the& dispute& and& deciding& whether& the& government’s& conduct& violated&
international&law&under&the&treaty.37&According&to&the&tribunal,&findings&of&procedural&propriety&
under&Guatemalan&law&were&not&binding&on&it&as&a&matter&of&law.&It&reasoned&that&the&outcome&
in&the&project&company’s&suit&against&the&regulator&under&domestic&law&could&not&determine&the&
outcome&of&the&minority&shareholder’s&suit&against&Guatemala&under&the&treaty&as&the&different&
cases&involved&different&parties&and&different&legal&standards.38&
Ultimately,& the& tribunal& determined& that& Guatemala& violated& the& investment& treaty& when& it&
decided& to& rely& on& one& expert& report& regarding& appropriate& tariff& calculations& rather& than&
another&expert&report,&and,&according&to&the&tribunal,&did&not&provide&adequate&reasons&for&its&
choice.&&&
Some& cases& indicate& that& treatyTbased& obligations& to& renegotiate& are& obligations& regarding&
results& that& are& binding& on& the& government,& rather& than& merely& obligations& as& to& process& or&
efforts.&In&Impregilo(v.(Argentina,39&the&tribunal&determined&that&the&government&breached&the&
FET& obligation& by& not& renegotiating& the& water& and& sanitation& services& concession& in& order& to&
restore& the& economic& equilibrium& of& the& contract& in& response& to& the& economic& crisis& in& the&
country&and&the&decision&by&the&government&to&deTpeg&the&peso&from&the&dollar&and&establish&a&
floating&exchange&rate.&The&tribunal&reasoned:&
325.(The(Arbitral(Tribunal(considers(that,(once(the(value(of(the(peso(was(determined(by(
market(conditions,(the(balance(provided(for(in(Article(12.1.1([setting(forth(the(principles(
on( which( tariffs( would( be( calculated]40(no( longer( existed( and( that,( according( to( Article(
12.1.1,( it( was( then( incumbent( on( the( Province,( in( order( to( treat( AGBA( in( a( fair( and(
equitable( manner,( to( find( appropriate( solutions( to( restore( the( envisaged( balance.( In(
other(words,(since(the(new(exchange(rate(caused(by(the(abolition(of(the(fixed(legal(rate(
had( highly( detrimental( effects( on( AGBA,( the( Province( should( have( offered( AGBA( a(
reasonable( adjustment( of( its( obligations( under( the( Concession( Contract.(
(

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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&Teco&v.&Guatemala,&para.&517.&&
39
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326.(Indeed,(it(appears(that(the(Emergency(Law(also(envisaged(a(renegotiation(of(public(
utilities(agreements(to(adapt(them(to(the(new(exchange(system.(This(would(have(been(a(
basis( for( finding( a( new( equilibrium( between( the( Parties( to( the( Concession( Agreement(
and(for(ensuring(that(Impregilo,(as(shareholder(in(AGBA,(was(granted(fair(and(equitable(
treatment.(
…(
330.( Since( the( disturbance( of( the( equilibrium( between( rights( and( obligations( in( the(
concession( was( essentially( due( to( measures( taken( by( the( Argentine( legislator( [in(
establishing(the(floating(exchange(rate(and(regulating(water(and(sewerage(services],(it(
must(have(been(incumbent(on(Argentina(to(act(to(effectively(restore(an(equilibrium(on(a(
new(or(modified(basis.(Although(Argentina(has(attributed(the(failure(of(the(negotiations(
to(what(it(regarded(as(AGBA’s(unreasonable(demands,(it(does(not(appear(that(Argentina(
took( any( measures( to( create( for( AGBA( a( reasonable( basis( for( pursuing( its( tasks( as(
concessionaire( which( had( been( negatively( affected( by( the( emergency( legislation,(
including(the(New(Regulatory(Framework.(
331.(In(these(circumstances,(the(Arbitral(Tribunal(considers(that(Argentina,(by(failing(to(
restore( a( reasonable( equilibrium( in( the( concession,( aggravated( its( situation( to( such(
extent(as(to(constitute(a(breach(of(its(duty(under(the(BIT(to(afford(a(fair(and(equitable(
treatment(to(Impregilo’s(investment.41&
&
The& tribunal’s& decision& thus& seems& to& read& the& FET& obligation& as& imposing& a& duty& on& the&
government&to&not&only&offer&or&engage&in&a&renegotiation&effort,&but&to&secure&an&outcome&fair&
to& the& investor& “restor[ing]& a& reasonable& equilibrium& in& the& concession.”& Yet& where,& as& in&
Impregilo,& the& claimant& in& the& treaty& dispute& is& a& minority& shareholder& in& the& domestic&
concessionaire,&and&that&the&concessionaire&is&not&a&party&to&the&treatyTbased&dispute&before&the&
tribunal,& it& likely& becomes& particularly& difficult& to& identify& whether& the& failure& to& restore&
equilibrium&was&due&to&conduct&of&the&government,&the&concessionaire,&or&both&parties.&&
Moreover,& in& this& case& a& duty& to& successfully& renegotiate& the& contract& would& likely& have& been&
particularly& challenging& due& to& the& fact& that& the& government& –& even& prior& to& the& country’s&
financial& crisis& and& currency& devaluation& –& had& been& facing& various& requests& by& the&
concessionaire& to& renegotiate& the& deal& by& reducing& its& investment& commitments& and& service&
obligations,& and& might& have& wanted& to& avoid& counterproposals& it& was& unwilling& to& accept.&
Indeed,& as& the& tribunal& noted& in& support& of& its& finding& of& liability,& the& government& appeared&
“reluctant& to& renegotiate& the& Concession& Contract”& and& was& concerned& about& making&
“adjustments& in& favor& of& the& [concessionaire]& …& as& this& would& have& negative& effects& for& the&
customers& whose& economic& interests& required& protection. 42 &In& such& circumstances,& one& can&
perceive,&as&Argentina&contended,&that&the&failure&of&renegotiations&may&have&been&due&at&least&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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in& part& to& the& concessionaire’s& demands& being& unreasonable. 43 &Nevertheless,& under& the&
tribunal’s& interpretation& of& the& treaty’s& rule,& it& appears& that& the& government& is& subject& to&
demands,& standards& and& attendant& potential& liabilities& that& do& not& similarly& apply& to&
concessionaires,&much&less&the&minority&shareholders&in&those&companies.&&
The&familiar&caveat&to&these&decisions&and&any&conclusion&regarding&them&again&applies:&Briefs&
and&decisions&by&courts&and&tribunals&demonstrate&that&not&all&states,&arbitrators,&or&reviewing&
judges& agree& that& the& FET& obligation& incorporates& these& requirements& of& good& faith,&
transparency,&or&administrative&due&process&whether&in&intraTdeal&reviews&or&renegotiations,&or&
other&circumstances.&The&cases&highlighted&here&are&not&used&to&show&what&the&law&is,&but&what&
the& decision& might& be,& lest& any& state& be& unsure& what& potential& liability& arises& as& a& result& of&
investment&treaties.&&

EXTRATDEAL&RENEGOTIATIONS&
ExtraTdeal& renegotiations& involve& intense& challenges& and& pressures,& not& least& because& they& are&
usually&unwanted&by&one&party:&
Unlike(negotiations(for(the(original(transaction,(which(are(generally(fueled(by(both(sides’(
hopes( for( future( benefits,( extra8deal( negotiations( begin( with( both( parties’( shattered(
expectations.(One(side(has(failed(to(achieve(the(benefits(expected(from(the(transaction,(
and(the(other(is(being(asked(to(give(up(something(for(which(it(bargained(hard(and(which(
it(hoped(to(enjoy(for(a(long(time.(Whereas(both(parties(to(the(negotiation(of(a(proposed(
new( venture( participate( willingly,( if( not( eagerly,( one( party( always( participates(
reluctantly,( if( not( downright( unwillingly,( in( an( extra8deal( renegotiation.( Beyond( mere(
disappointed( expectations,( extra8deal( renegotiations,( by( their( very( nature,( can( create(
bad( feeling( and( mistrust.( One( side( believes( it( is( being( asked( to( give( up( something( to(
which(it(has(a(legal(and(moral(right.(It(views(the(other(side(as(having(gone(back(on(its(
word,(as(having(acted(in(bad(faith(by(reneging(on(the(deal.(Indeed,(the(reluctant(party(
may(even(feel(that(it(is(being(coerced(into(participating(in(extra8deal(renegotiations(since(
a( refusal( to( do( so( would( result( in( losing( the( investment( it( has( already( made( in( the(
transaction.44(
These&characteristics&of&extraTdeal&renegotiations&are&evident&in&and&important&for&considering&
treatyTbased&investorTstate&arbitration.&This&is&primarily&because&if&the&investor&is&the&unwilling&
party&that&feels&unfairly&forced&to&renegotiate,&it&can&seek&treatyTbased&relief&by&threatening&or&
pursuing&investorTstate&arbitration.&By&pursuing&this&avenue,&the&investor&can&try&to&convince&its&
state&counterparty&not&to&pursue&extraTlegal&renegotiation;&and,&if&the&state&insists,&the&investor&
can&seek&compensation&for&any&costs&it&is&asked&to&incur,&thereby&undoing&if&not&mitigating&the&
consequences&of&the&renegotiation.&

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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Alternatively,& if& the& investor& seeks& renegotiation,& the& government& has& no& recourse& under& the&
investment&treaty.&Investment&treaties&give&investors,&not&states,&protections&and&the&ability&to&
initiate&investorTstate&disputes.&&
This& asymmetry& can& put& states& at& a& significant& disadvantage& visTàTvis& their& contracting& parties,&
creating&scenarios&in&which&they&may&be&brought&back&to&the&negotiating&table&against&their&will&
in&order&to&save&a&deal,&while&their&own&ability&to&force&investors&to&renegotiate&aspects&of&the&
agreement&is&weakened.&This&is&especially&important&given&that&studies&have&shown&investors&–&
not& states& –& are& commonly& the& drivers& for& extraTlegal& renegotiations.& Indeed,& one& review& of&
1,000& concession& contracts& in& the& telecommunications,& transportation,& water& and& sanitation&
services,&and&electricity&sectors&that&were&awarded&in&Latin&America&and&the&Caribbean&between&
the&midT1980s&and&2000&found&that&extraTlegal&renegotiations&were&“extremely&common”45&and&
in&61&percent&of&those&renegotiations,&the&renegotiations&were&requested&by&the&concessionaire&
or& operator.& In& 26& percent& the& government& initiated& the& renegotiation.& The& remaining& cases&
consisted&of&those&in&which&both&the&concessionaire&and&the&government&sought&renegotiation.46&&
That& study& shows& that& firmTled& renegotiations& are& particularly& common& in& cases& where& the&
contract& was& awarded& through& competitive& bidding& as& opposed& to& direct& negotiations.& This,&
researchers& explain,& appears& to& reflect& the& fact& that& investors& are& able& to& secure& contracts& by&
underbidding& (e.g.,& on& tariffs)& or& overbidding& (e.g..& on& payments& to& the& government& and&
investment& contributions),& with& the& intent& or& effect& of& subsequently& opportunistically&
renegotiating& the& deal.& In& contrast,& when& securing& the& contract& through& direct& negotiations,&
investors&are&more&likely&to&“secure&all&the&benefits&or&rents&at&the&start,&making&renegotiation&
unnecessary&from&the&operator’s&perspective.”47&
Investors&are&also&more&likely&to&seek&renegotiation&when&the&contract&is&structured&in&a&way&that&
the&risk&of&changes&in&circumstances&and&adverse&events&are&born&by&them&(e.g.,&through&a&priceT
cap& system& of& regulating& tariffs)& rather& than& the& government& (e.g.,& through& a& rateTofTreturn&
method),48&and&when&the&government&is&susceptible&to&renegotiation,&which&may&be&due&to&such&
factors& as& capture& or& corruption,& or& lack& of& regulatory& strength& and& capacity& to& resist&
opportunistic&renegotiation&requests.49&
Once&renegotiation&is&sought,&investors&have&strong&power&to&get&states&back&to&the&negotiating&
table:&
[T]he(operator(has(significant(leverage,(because(the(government(is(often(unable(to(reject(
renegotiation(and(is(usually(unwilling(to(claim(failure—and(let(the(operator(abandon(the(
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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&Guasch,& p.& 81.& According& to& the& study,& 30& percent& of& these& concessions& were& renegotiated.&
Among&the&concession&contracts&for&water&and&sanitation&services,&that&number&was&74&percent,&
and& for& transportation& contracts,& 55& percent.& The& study& did& not& count& as& renegotiations&
standard,&scheduled&tariff&adjustments&or&periodic&tariff&reviews.&Id.&at&80.&
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concession—for(fear(of(political(backlash(and(additional(transaction(costs.(In(such(cases(
the(operator,(through(renegotiations,(can(undermine(all(the(benefits(of(the(bidding8(or(
auction8(led(competitive(process.50&
Thus,&although&discussions&about&foreign&investment&in&infrastructure&and&other&capital&intensive&
projects&frequently&mention&the&phenomenon&of&the&“obsolescing&bargain”&in&which&an&investor&
with& significant& fixed& assets& in& the& host& country& becomes& hostage& to& government& power& and&
discretion,51&the& dominance& of& this& narrative& obscures& a& different& reality& –& one& in& which& the&
government&is&held&hostage&to&opportunistic&renegotiations.&
Against&that&background,&it&is&especially&crucial&to&review&how&tribunals&have&treated&extraTlegal&
renegotiations;& and& the& cases& suggest& governments& & have& significant& cause& for& concern& that&
these&decisions&may&greatly&tilt&the&balance&of&power&in&favor&of&investors&even&where&investors&
already&enjoy&important&leverage.&In&particular,&investment&treaties&seem&to&erect&an&important&
shield&around&investors&protecting&them&from&government&attempts&to&renegotiate&agreements,&
while& placing& pressure& on& governments& to& come& back& to& the& table& when& requested& by& the&
investor.&
Government)led,Renegotiations,
Various& investment& disputes& have& arisen& precisely& out& of& a& scenario& in& which& the& change& was&
requested&by&the&government,&putting&the&investor&in&the&position&of&the&reluctant&renegotiator.&
In,& response,& investors& have& used& investment& arbitration& (or& the& threat& of& arbitration)& to&
challenge&government&efforts&to&“pressure”&them&to&renegotiate&deals.&&
Investors&have&succeeded&on&these&claims,&with&at&least&some&tribunals&finding&that&governments&
violate& the& investment& treaties& when& trying& to& get& their& contracting& party& to& renegotiate& their&
deal.52&The& motives& and& methods& used& to& secure& renegotiations& have& also& been& relevant& to&
tribunals’& views& on& liability,& as& investors& –& with& varying& degrees& of& success& –& have& argued& that&
governments’& “political”& motives& and/or& exercises& of& sovereign& powers& are& key& factors&
supporting&treaty&breach.&
&One&case&highlighting&these&issues&is&Vivendi(v.(Argentina(II,&in&which&the&tribunal&concluded&that&
government& officials& in& an& Argentine& province& breached& the& investment& treaty& by& improperly&
pressuring&the&concessionaire&to&renegotiate&the&agreement.&&
In& that& case,& even& before& the& concession& was& awarded,& there& was& notable& opposition& to& the&
privatization& of& the& water& services& at& the& heart& of& the& dispute;& and& after& transfer& to& the&
concessionaire,&that&opposition&escalated,&fueled&by&a&number&of&factors,&including&a&change&in&
government,&the&concessionaire’s&doubling&of&tariffs&charged,&lack&of&certainty&among&residents&
and&governments&about&the&conditions&of&the&concession&and&terms&of&the&contract,&and&major&
problems&in&delivery&of&water,&including&incidents&of&red&turbidity&over&the&course&of&one&to&two&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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months,&and&black&turbidity&that&lasted&over&the&course&of&two&weeks,&neither&of&which&users&had&
previously& experienced.53&Media& attention& on& the& concession& and& its& operation& intensified;& an&
independent&ombudsman&advised&water&users&of&their&legal&rights&and&remedies&regarding&issues&
with& payment& and& service& quality;& individual& legislators& made& comments& critical& of& the&
concession&and,&like&the&ombudsman,&also&gave&citizens&information&regarding&their&rights&with&
respect&to&the&concessionaire;&the&legislature&appointed&a&special&committee&to&investigate&the&
legitimacy&of&the&concession&contract;&and&the&Court&of&Accounts&issued&a&report&questioning&the&
agreement’s& consistency& with& the& law.& There& was,& therefore,& notable& pressure& on& the&
government&to&address&these&concerns;&prompting&its&requests&for&renegotiations&of&the&tariff,&
but&also&contemplating&that&the&investor&would&be&able&to&reduce&its&investment&commitments&
and&obligations&to&extend&service.&
Reviewing& these& events,& the& tribunal& concluded& that& the& government& had& “mounted& an&
illegitimate& ‘campaign’& against& the& concession,& the& concession& Agreement,& and& the& ‘foreign’&
concessionaire& from& the& moment& it& took& office,& aimed& either& at& reversing& the& privatization& or&
forcing& the& concessionaire& to& renegotiate& (and& lower)& CAA’s& tariff’s.” 54 &The& tribunal& further&
declared& that& the& government’s& “soTcalled& regulatory& activity& constituted& ongoing,& unfair& and&
inequitable& behavior& because& it& was& no& more& than& politically& driven& armTtwisting& aimed& at&
compelling& Claimants& to& agree& to& new& terms& to& the& Concession& Agreement& which& were&
acceptable&to&the&new&government.”55&Such&conduct,&the&tribunal&determined,&violated&the&FET&
standard&under&the&treaty.&
The&tribunal’s&finding&of&liability&thus&seemed&to&largely&hinge&on&its&view&that&the&government’s&
actions& were& motivated& by& “political”& concerns& and& through& public& and& governmental& means.&
The& tribunal& highlighted& the& role& of& the& individual& legislators,& legislature,& ombudsman,&
concession& regulator,& and& the& governor& of& the& province& as& forming& part& of& this& political&
“campaign”& against& the& concessionaire& and& criticized& the& government’s& apparent& role& in&
harming,&rather&than&improving,&the&relationship&between&the&concessionaire&and&the&public.&&
This&approach&raises&a&number&of&issues&for&governments.&For&one,&through&such&a&totality&of&the&
circumstances& approach& where& liability& is& based& on& the& perception& of& a& “campaign”&
implemented& by& a& variety& of& different& actors& who& accountable& to& different& individuals& and&
groups&within&and&outside&the&government,&the&tribunal&applied&a&standard&that&can&be&breached&
even&if&each&individual&act&making&up&that&“campaign”&could&not&or&would&not&give&rise&to&liability&
under& domestic& or& international& law.56&This& standard& may& be& particularly& difficult& for& states& to&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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comply&with&as&many&of&the&actions&alleged&to&be&wrongful&here&–&e.g.,&comments&to&the&press,&
communications& to& the& public,& government& responses& to& public& outcries,& and& legislative&
establishment& of& investigative& committees& –& are& common& if& not& encouraged& in& democratic&
governments.& Indeed,& such& actions& as& are& often& even& given& enhanced& free& speech& protections&
and&immunities&from&discovery&and/or&liability&in&order&to&avoid&chilling&them.&&&
Moreover,& the& tribunal’s& approach& focusing& on& the& “political”& motives& for& the& government’s&
efforts&to&renegotiate&the&contract&fails&to&take&into&account&that&governments&likely&will&by&their&
very& nature& –& and& should& be& –& responsive& to& and& driven& by& political& motives& as& those& are&
ultimately&driven&by&the&needs&and&demands&of&constituents&they&represent,&particularly&when&
the&contract&relates&to&provision&of&essential&public&services.&Just&as&a&project&company&may&seek&
renegotiation&in&order&to&satisfy&shareholders,&lenders&or&other&key&stakeholders&to&whom&they&
owe&duties,&governments&may&seek&renegotiation&in&order&to&respond&to&and&advance&the&needs&
of&the&citizens&to&whom&they&are&also&accountable.&
Other& tribunals& have& similarly& focused& on& the& nature& or& mode& of& government& conduct& used& to&
bring&a&private&party&back&to&the&negotiating&table.57&In&PSEG(v.(Turkey,&when&the&claimant&had&
sought&government&approval&to&convert&its&public&law&contract&to&a&private&law&one&giving&it&the&
right& to& arbitrate& disputes,& the& government& indicated& that& it& would& only& agree& to& support& the&
claimant’s& application& if& the& claimant& agreed& to& renegotiate& certain& aspects& of& the& underlying&
contract.& The& tribunal& considered& the& government’s& attempt& to& impose& that& condition& an&
improper&exercise&of&sovereign&authority&and&relied&on&it&when&finding&that&the&government&had&
violated&the&treaty.58&
AES(v.(Hungary&is&similarly&critical&of&government&efforts&to&use&sovereign&powers&to&encourage&
or&“force”&renegotiations:&
[I]t(cannot(be(considered(a(reasonable(measure([consistent(with(the(for(a(state(to(use(its(
governmental(powers([including(its(power(to(implement(laws(or(issue(decrees](to(force(a(
private(party(to(change(or(give(up(its(contractual(rights.(If(the(state(has(the(conviction(
that(its(contractual(obligations(to(its(investors(should(no(longer(be(observed((even(if(it(is(
a( commercial( contract,( which( is( the( case),( the( state( would( have( to( end( such( contracts(
and(assume(the(contractual(consequences(of(such(early(termination.59&
With&respect&to&the&motives,&the&AES(v.(Hungary&tribunal&said&–&in&contrast&to&Vivendi(II&–&that&
“political”& reasons& for& taking& action& could& weigh& against,& rather& than& in& favor& of& liability.& That&
case& had& centered& around& Hungary’s& actions& to& address& alleged& excessive& profits& obtained& by&
electricity&generators&under&the&country’s&pricing&regime.&The&tribunal&noted&that&the&level&of&the&
companies’&returns&had&become&“a&public&issue&and&something&of&a&political&lightning&rod&in&the&
face&of&upcoming&elections”;60&but&rather&than&evidencing&the&irrationality&of&the&government’s&
conduct,& the& political& attention& on& the& matter& indicated& it& was& a& public& policy& topic& of&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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widespread& concern& that& the& government& could& legitimately& address& through& exercise& of& its&
lawmaking&powers.&If&exercise&(or&potential&exercise)&of&government&authority&had&the&effect&of&
encouraging&the&investor&to&renegotiate&the&underlying&contract&then,&under&the&AES&tribunal’s&
reasoning,&that&fact&would&not&be&sufficient&to&render&the&government’s&conduct&a&breach&of&the&
investment&treaty.&&
In& another& departure& from& the& Vivendi( II& approach,& in& Electrabel( v.( Hungary,& the& tribunal&
rejected& the& claimant’s& assertion& that& Hungary’s& actions& seeking,& inter& alia,& renegotiations& of&
power& purchase& agreements,& were& improperly& driven& by& “political”& motives& and& thus& violated&
the&FET&obligation.61&The&tribunal&stated:&
There( is( no( doubt( that( by( late( 2005( and( early( 2006( there( was( political( and( public(
controversy( in( Hungary( over( the( perceived( high( level( of( profits( made( by( Hungarian(
Generators,( including( Dunamenti.( However,( politics( is( what( democratic( governments(
necessarily(address;(and(it(is(not,(ipso(facto,(evidence(of(irrational(or(arbitrary(conduct(
for( a( government( to( take( into( account( political( or( even( populist( controversies( in( a(
democracy(subject(to(the(rule(of(law.62(
Firm)led,Renegotiation,
Other&cases&have&looked&at&government&conduct&in&response&to&investor&requests&for&extraTdeal&
renegotiations,&and&have&signaled&that&even&when&the&government&had&no&legal&duty&under&the&
relevant& contract& to& enter& into& or& conclude& those& renegotiations,& investment& treaties& may&
impose& certain& requirements& regarding& how& to& respond& to& those& renegotiation& requests.& In&
Biwater( v.( Tanzania,& for& instance,& the& tribunal& recognized& that& the& government& had& no& legal&
obligation& under& the& contract& to& enter& into& the& broad& renegotiations& sought& by& the& water&
services& concessionaire,& but& that& it& nevertheless& decided& to& accommodate& the& concessionaire&
and&engage&in&those&discussions.&Rather&than&rejecting&the&claimant’s&claim&that&the&government&
was& liable& for& its& conduct& in& those& renegotiations& on& the& ground& that& the& government& had& no&
duty&to&engage&in&them&in&the&first&place,&the&tribunal&proceeded&to&scrutinize&the&government’s&
approach&to&procedural&and&substantive&aspects&of&those&talks.&It&ultimately&concluded&that&the&
government&performed&the&renegotiation&in&good&faith,&was&not&unreasonable&in&its&decision&to&
require& that& the& renegotiations& be& conducted& within& a& limited& timeframe,63&and& was& also& not&
unreasonable& in& its& decision& to& reject& the& concessionaire’s& proposal& or& to& require& the&
concessionaire&accept&certain&of&the&government’s&own&terms.64&&
This&decision,&similar&to&PSEG(v.(Turkey,&suggests&that&investors&dissatisfied&with&the&process&or&
outcome&of&investorTinitiated&extraTdeal&renegotiations&may&be&able&to&use&investment&treaties&
to& challenge& the& procedures& adopted& and& stances& taken& by& governments& in& those& talks,&
potentially&providing&them&leverage&over&their&government&counterparty&to&the&contract.&&
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
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VI.&

CONCLUDING&REMARKS&&

As& this& paper& illustrates,& investment& treaties& impose& vaguely& worded& but& often& broadly&
interpreted&obligations&on&host&states,&and&typically&provide&foreign&investors&a&right&to&enforce&
those& obligations& through& investorTstate& arbitration.& Through& their& standards& and& arbitration&
mechanisms,&these&treaties&can&expose&host&countries&to&significant&potential&and&actual&liability,&
and&can&have&profound&impacts&on&the&development&and&implementation&of&industrial&and&other&
public& policies.& Moreover,& the& long& lives& of& the& agreements& and& the& degree& to& which& arbitral&
awards& are& insulated& against& judicial& review& make& it& difficult& for& states& to& address& and& correct&
unintended&and&unforeseen&impacts&of&the&treaties.&
While& states& can& take& a& fresh& look& at& issues& regarding& the& optimal& design& of& their& investment&
treaties&when&negotiating&new&texts,&they&are&more&limited&in&terms&of&how&they&address&issues&
that&have&arisen&under&existing&treaties.&Nevertheless,&given&the&number&of&existing&agreements&
(over& 3,000& worldwide),& the& potentially& broad& obligations& they& impose,& and& their& extended&
duration,& it& is& crucial& for& states& to& also& examine& those& treaties& and& take& steps& to& clarify&
uncertainties&and&ambiguities&so&that&the&texts&best&reflect&the&signatory&states’&intent.&&
For& existing& treaties,& states& have& three& main& options:& (1)& termination& of& the& treaty,& (2)&
negotiation&of&amendments&to&the&treaty&(or&supplanting&existing&agreements&with&new&ones),&
and&(3)&interpretations&and&clarifications&of&treaty&provisions&that&must&be&taken&into&account&by&
tribunals& interpreting& the& treaties.& All& three& are& important& to& consider& as& part& of& an& overall&
strategy&for&aligning&investment&agreements&to&domestic&policy&goals.&
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